This paper proposes a network phenotyping mechanism based on network resource usage analysis for network traffic classification and anomaly detection. The network phenotyping may use different metrics in the cyber-physical systems (CPS), including resource and network usage monitoring, physical state estimation. The set of devices will collectively decide a holistic view of the entire system through advanced image analysis and machine learning methods. In this paper, we choose the network traffic pattern as a study case to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, while the methodology may similarly apply to classification and anomaly detection for other resource metrics. We extract and recognize the spatial and temporal communication patterns based on the network resource usage. The phenotype method is testified through four realworld decentralized applications. With proper length of network resource usage, the overall recognition accuracy achieves as high as 99%. Sequentially, the recognition accuracy is used to detect the network traffic anomaly. We simulate the anomalous usage to be 10%, 20% and 30% of the normal network resource usage. The experiments show the proposed method is efficient in detecting each intensity of network resource usage anomaly.
I. INTRODUCTION
D EVICES in cyber-physical systems (CPS) are interconnected for collaborative sensing, computing and control, and vulnerable to cyber and physical attacks [1] , [2] , [3] . Due to the limited computing and energy resources, complicated cryptography could not be implemented in CPS devices and systems. Besides that, the bugs of softwares, operating systems and firmwares make the system vulnerable [4] , so ways to monitor the system health are needed. Malwares like Stunex [5] and Duqu [6] have caused a lot of concerns. Thus, how to ascertain the devices of a CPS are trustworthy is becoming an important and open question.
Resource usage analysis is a promising approach to verify the trustworthiness of CPS devices. The usage of resources such as CPU, memory and network of the devices is used in resources usage methods. The inside states of devices could thus be inferred, which is useful for system management. For example, [7] , [8] analyzed the user behaviors by tracking the energy consumptions. However, they only targeted individual devices. Some recent work [9] , [10] proposed to monitor HPC systems by collecting detailed resource usage information to detect anomalous behaviors. But they didn't consider the cooccurrence of resources usage among the HPCs. Besides, collecting and transmitting detailed information might not be practical for devices of low hardware configuration which have limited computing and bandwidth resources. In a CPS system, interconnected devices work together running decentralized applications. The devices will collectively decide a holistic view of the entire system. Unlike desktop computers or servers, a CPS only runs very limited number of applications simultaneously. Thus, the resource usage of a CPS could be characterized by analyzing the resource usage patterns of decentralized applications that would run on the CPS devices.
In this paper, we choose the network traffic pattern as a study case to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, while the methodology may similarly apply to classification and anomaly detection based on other resource metrics. We first apply texture feature analysis to extract the spatial information of the network resource usage of the CPS devices at the same time samples. Then, we study the temporal information of the extracted texture features in time series. The spatial and temporal features together of the network resource usage determine the communication patterns of the CPS network. At last, a supervised learning method, k-NN classification, is used to classify and recognize the communication patterns. The phenotype method is experimented on four real-world decentralized applications. With proper length of sampled continuous network resource usage, the overall recognition accuracy is about 99%. Sequentially, the recognition error is used to detect the anomalous network resource usage. We simulate the anomalous network resource usage to be as equal as 10%, 20% and 30% of the normal network resource usage. The experiment results show the proposed anomaly detection method is efficient and effective to detect each network resource usage anomaly intensity.
The contributions of this work are summarized below:
• To our best knowledge, this work is the first to phenotype a whole CPS network instead of individual devices. • This work presents a novel method to characterize the network resource usage of four real-world decentralized applications based on spatial and temporal analysis and machine learning. • This work also proposes a straightforward and efficient method to detect abnormal network resource usages of a CPS network.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II shows the preliminaries of the proposed approaches. Section III proposes the method to phenotype the CPS network based on network resource usage analysis and the method to detect anomaly network traffic. Section IV shows and discusses the experiment results. Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. System Model
Cloud is often used to visualize and analyze data collected from the CPS devices, as shown in Fig. 1 . System management is provided with the monitoring information about the states of all the CPS devices for security operations, such as shutting down or restarting the CPS network because of the detected abnormal behaviors. In this model, the system management is provided with realtime network resource usage information through the cloud. From the sensor perspectives, the network resource usage application running locally on every CPS device works as a sensor, which monitors its network resource usage. The set of sensors collectively decide a holistic view of the whole CPS network. The CPS devices might be equipped with heterogeneous hardware and software configurations and those devices are interconnected. However, generally, those devices are resource-constrained and only very limited number of applications run on the CPS at the same time. The applications running on the CPS are decentralized and the devices are scheduled to collect data from their built-in sensors or transmit/receive data to/from their neighboring devices. According to the different applications running on the CPS, the devices present application-specific communication features when different sizes of data are transmitted/received. Hence, we propose to phenotype the CPS network by analyzing the communication features of the applications.
Assuming there are 100 CPS devices in an example CPS network in Fig. 1 , i.e., N is 100, the devices are interconnected with each other directly or indirectly in a mesh network. The discussion of the rest of the paper is based on this CPS network example. Note that the proposed phenotype method and anomaly detection method does not depend on the topology of the CPS network, as the communication patterns are adaptively learned in a data-driven style.
B. Threat Model
Due to the fact that CPS devices are lacking of strong secure protection, the CPS devices are vulnerable to cyber attacks. One common threat is that the CPS devices could be infected by malwares and turned into a botnet [11] . On one hand, infected CPS devices might bring in extra network activities, including scanning the other devices, probing insecure ports, spreading malwares in the CPS network, receiving commands from remote hidden attacks, or updating malwares to new versions. On the other hand, once the botnet is formed on the CPS network, the CPS devices might join a Denial of service (DoS) attack against remote target servers. An aggressive botnet could consume a lot of network resource and cause the applications running on the CPS network to process very slowly or halt, which is trivial to spot for the system management. Hence, we consider a more sophisticated case, in which the botnet only carries out a light DoS attack that won't affect normal CPS device functions. Many light DoS attacks from different botnets together could still evade the targets. A light DoS attack brings in additional network traffic among the CPS devices but would not affect the process of the applications running on the CPS network, and hence it is harder to detect. In both cases, the abnormal network activities introduce anomaly network traffic to the CPS network along with the normal network traffic.
C. Definitions
For the ease of discussion, let's introduce the definitions for this paper here.
Definition 1: Network throughput, the real-time sum of transmitting and receiving data speeds of a CPS device;
Definition 2: Communication matrix, a matrix comprised of the network throughput of all CPS devices at a time;
Definition 3: Communication picture, a picture created to visualize the communication pattern;
Definition 4: Texture feature snippet, a slice of the timeseries texture features;
Definition 5: Coefficient matrix, each element of which is the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between two time-series texture features of a texture feature snippet.
Definition 6: Communication pattern, partial elements of a coefficient matrix.
III. PHENOTYPING THE CPS NETWORK AND DETECTING
ANOMALY NETWORK TRAFFIC
For the CPS devices in Fig. 1 , the communication between every device and other devices is scheduled by the decentralized applications running on the CPS network. Each application has its own unique schedule. Based on this observation, we propose to phenotype the CPS network by analyzing the network traffic of the decentralized applications.
A. Spatial Analysis of the Communication Image
By reading the network throughput of every CPS device in Fig. 1 and organizing them by their device ID number, we get an communication image by visualizing the network throughput of every device as a pixel. Fig. 2 is a communication image example. There are 100 pixels in the figure and x stands for the xth row of the picture and y stands for the yth column of the picture. p(x, y), the value of the xth row and yth column pixel, is the network throughput of the (10 * x + y)th device.
Each communication image represents the network resource usage of the whole CPS network at a time point. According to the different applications running on it at that time, the corresponding communication images are different. Texture analysis is an important element of human vision and has been apply to problems of texture classification, discrimination and 978-1-5386-3443-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE segmentation [12] . Thus, we choose to utilize texture feature analysis [12] , [13] , [14] on the communication images. According to [15] , there are many different kinds of texture features. In this paper, we propose to transform the communication image into multiple single values to reduce the computation complexity. Hence, we choose the statistics based feature extraction methods, which are classified into three classes: first-order statistics, second-order statistics and higher-order statistics. First-order statistics only consider the individual pixels. Second-order statistics depend on the cooccurrence of neighboring pixels. Higher-order statistics are to deal with nonlinearities and non-Gaussianity. In our case, the interconnected devices of the CPS network work collaboratively so that the network throughput of neighboring devices are related to each other. Hence, this paper chooses GLCM (gray level co-occurrence matrix) texture features, the most popular second-order statistical texture features. We select five GLCM texture features: energy, entropy, contrast, IDM (Inverse Difference Moment) and DM (Directional Moment) [15] . To get the texture features, we need to firstly convert the communication images into GLCM.
1) Convert the communication images into GLCM: Table  I is the corresponding intensity (gray-level) values. Note that we normalize the network throughputs of the devices to be within the range of 0 to 4 for the ease of demonstrating how to convert the communication image into GLCM. Let's denote the rang length as L and in this example L equals to 5.
Table II is the resultant GLCM. i and j stand for the ith row and jth column of the GLCM matrix, respectively. Each element #(i, j) in the GLCM is the sum of the time sample number that the pixel with value i occurred in the specified spatial relationship to a pixel with value j in the communication image [16] . There are four different kinds of relationship between two adjacent pixels: horizontal, vertical, positive diagonal and anti-diagonal. Take the horizontal relationship for example: as shown in Table I , all the horizontal adjacent pixel pairs that is (1,2) are circled. Hence it is easy to see #(1, 2), circled in Table II, equals to 6.   TABLE I: Intensity values of the example communication  image.   1  3  2  0  2  4  1  2  1  0  4  1  2  2  4  1  1  0  1  2  1  3  2  0  4  2  3  3  1  3  4  2  2  3  3  4  2  4  3  3  1  3  1  4  1  4  2  1  3  1  1  0  1  0  1  3  2  4  3  1  0  4  2  4  1  4  3  1  0  3  3  3  1  0  0  3  2  4  3  2  1  3  3  3  0  1  2  2  4  2  0  3  4  3  2  3  2  2  3  1  1  2  0  3  2  1  2  1 3 4 
A GLCM is a L by L matrix. The larger L is, the more information of the communication picture is preserved. However, larger L also brings in more computation complexity.
2) Calculate GLCM texture features: As discussed in previous section, we can get four GLCMs from a communication picture from the perspectives of four different adjacent relationship between two pixels in the communication picture. For each GLCM, we apply the following five equations [15] : Energy:
Entropy:
Contrast:
IDM (Inverse Difference Moment):
DM (Directional Moment):
978-1-5386-3443-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE Energy, entropy, contrast, IDM and DM measure the intensity of pixel pair repetitions, the randomness of pixels, the extent of a pixel and its neighbors, local homogeneity of the communication image and alignment of it in terms of the angle, respectively. Let's denote the number of GLCM texture features N f we get from one communication picture. For each GLCM from the perspective of one adjacent relationship between two pixel, we get 5 GLCM texture features. Thus, we get 5 * 4 = 20 GLCM texture features in total, i.e. N f = 20.
B. Temporal Analysis of GLCM Texture Features
As mentioned earlier, each communication image stands for the network resource usage of the CPS network at a time sample. The GLCM texture features of a single communication are not enough to represent the applications running on the CPS devices. We consider the communication feature as the transition of the texture features, i.e., the communicate feature is showed by both the N f texture feature values and the timeseries trends of them.
In Fig. 3 , we illustrate the time-series trends of the texture feature values of an example application for only one adjacent relationship between two pixels 1 . The horizontal axis is time and the vertical axis is texture feature value. We record the example application every second 2 for 300 seconds, starting about 50 seconds before the application starts and around 50 seconds after it ends. The example application lasts around 200 seconds. The value of the points the N f curves go through and the time-series trends of the curves representing the communication features of the example application. In order to extract more communication features of one decentralized application ruining on the interconnected CPS network, we slice the time-series texture feature trends into texture feature snippets by using a sliding window. 1 In order to show all the five curves in one picture, we normalize the Energy and Entropy by timing them with 10 5 . 2 The communication images are recorded every second throughout this paper.
Assume the running time of an application is T seconds and the communication images are recorded at every second. Assume the size of the sliding window is T S , then every texture feature snippet consists of N f * T S texture feature values. The sliding window moves once a second, hence we have T − T S + 1 snippets for this application.
2) Coefficient matrix: We observe that each time the CPS network runs a certain application, all the time-series texture feature trends are stochastic. However, the similarities between each two time-series texture feature trends are stable. Hence we propose to use the similarities between each two timeseries texture feature trends as the communication patterns. Pearson Correlation Coefficient [17] is common method to calculate the similarity of two vectors. As shown in Equation 6, x and y are two time-series texture features, ρ(x, y) is the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between x and y.
Let's denote the ith time-series texture feature of the texture feature snippet as v i . By computing the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between every two time-series texture feature trends, we could get a N f times N f coefficient matrix as below:
2) Recognition of Communication Patterns: Then we use the trained model to recognize unknown communication patterns. Firstly, the model is given a communication pattern under recognition, s test . Then we searches the labeled communication patterns to find k communication patterns with shortest Euclidean distance with s test and store them in set Set K . The next step is find the label L p that labels most communication patterns in Set K . Label L p is the result of recognition.
D. Anomaly detection
Training the k-NN model must be done under safe environment, i.e., all the CPS devices are trustworthy. The anomaly detection period could be done under unsafe environment. Recollect the threat model in II-B that the attack would not affect the progress of the applications running on the CPS network. Since the tasks of the CPS network are scheduled by the system management, the system management know which application is running on the CPS network at any time. Once the network resource usage is compromised, the recognized application label would be different from expected label by the system management. Assume the recognition accuracy of the trained k-NN model for application A p (p ∈ [1, N A ]) is R p , we set the accuracy threshold T h p of it as T h p = R p * θ th . For application A p in period of anomaly detection, if the recognition accuracy R p is less than T h p , we consider the network resource usage of the CPS network as abnormal and otherwise, we consider it as normal.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section, we study four real-world applications, aggregation, broadcast, consensus and DGD (Distributed Gradient Descent). In CPS network, these four decentralized applications are very popular and they have different communication styles. In aggregation, each leaf device sends data to its father devices. The father devices process the received data and send same-size data to their father. As to broadcast, starting with root device, data are sent from father devices to their children devices. For consensus, each device sends data to its neighbors and calculate received data and send data and calculate received data again and again till convergence is reached. DGD is very similar to consensus. Each device do certain number of iterations of sending data to its neighbor and calculating received data. The difference is for DGD, each device is synchronized with its neighboring devices, but for consensus, each device is asynchronous with its neighboring devices.
The experiments are based on CORE Simulator. CORE Simulator is a network emulation tool that uses virtualization provided by FreeBSD jails, Linux OpenVZ containers, and Linux namespaces containers [19] . We set up 100 devices on it. We run every application on CORE Simulator for 200 times and the network throughput are recorded every second. We also run the CORE Simulator with executing none application as base reference for 200 times and record the network throughput every second as well. The normalization range L is empirically set as 9. In order to shorten the training time of k-NN model, we use principal component analysis to reduce the dimensions of the feature data. We choose to preserve 95% of the information of the communication patterns, reducing the original 210 dimensions to only 11 dimensions. The running time of these applications and the average network throughput of every CPS device throughput the running time of every application are shown as in Table III . In our experiment, we randomly choose 80% of the communication patterns of every application as training data and label them respectively. The rest 20% of the communication patterns of every application are used to test the accuracy of the proposed recognition method. We repeat this process several times to avoid over fitting.
A. Accuracy of the Proposed Method
This section presents the accuracy of the proposed method charactering the applications running on the CPS network. As shown in Fig. 4 , the horizontal axis strands for the size of the sliding window T S and the vertical axis stands for recognition accuracy. As we can see, the proposed method has achieved high accuracy. When T S is 50s, the recognition accuracy of the broadcast is 68%, which is lowest among all the applications. With the T S increasing, the recognition accuracy of all the applications become higher. When T S increase to 190s 3 , the recognition accuracy of all the applications are higher than 95%. However, T S also controls the granularity of the communication patterns. Smaller communication patterns could reflect more details of the feature of the network resource usage. Hence, we have to compromise between the recognition accuracy and the granularity of communication patterns.
B. Anomaly Detection
In this section, we show our proposed method is capable of detecting abnormal network traffic. As mentioned in section II-B, both of the two kinds of extra network activities could bring in additional network traffic to any CPS device. Thus we simulate the anomaly network traffic by adding different intensity of random network throughput to every device when the CPS devices are running. We choose anomaly network throughput to be as equal as 10%, 20% and 30% of the normal average throughput for every application. For each intensity of anomaly network throughput, We run every application for 40 times. We set T S as 100s since the trained k-NN model archives good balance between the recognition accuracy and the granularity of communication patterns when the T S is As we can see, for each intensity of anomaly network traffic, the recognition accuracy of aggregation, broadcast, Consensus and DGD is evidently lower than the corresponding thresholds, i.e., the proposed detection method succeeds in detecting the anomaly network traffic that caused by the both kinds of extra network activities.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a network phenotyping mechanism based on network resource usage patterns to identify compromised network traffic. The proposed phenotyping method is based on transforming the network resource usage into timeseries texture feature values, thus the computation complexity is reduced. We also apply both spatial and temporal analysis of the network resource usage. The phenotyping method achieves every high accuracy of recognizing the communication patterns of four real-world decentralized applications. Additionally, the paper proposes a detection method to verify whether the network resource usage of the CPS network is normal. The detection method is straightforward and efficient. In the future, we plan to combine the network resource usage with other resource usage to phenotype the CPS network in more comprehensive ways. Besides that, this paper only considered one application running on the CPS network at a time, which is not always the case. We leave it as a future work to phenotype a CPS network with multiple applications running at the same time.
